Paul
Goble
Staunton, August 28 – Now that the
Russian military has invaded Ukraine and has engaged in combat with Ukrainian
forces, it is time to assess the ability of each country to mobilize its forces
for war. One Moscow commentator has done that and concluded that “the system of
mobilization of the Russian army is just as ineffective as that of the
Ukrainian.”
In the current issue of “Sovershenno
Sekretno,” Aleksandr Kruglov bases his conclusion not only on the fact that
neither country has moved far from its Soviet roots in this regard but also on
a close examination of what each has been doing to change that situation in
recent years (sovsekretno.ru/articles/id/4295/).
Ukraine’s problems with mobilization
have received wide attention in the Russian media over the last months, and
Kruglov summarizes them. Efforts to
draft more men have fallen short, often far short, even in western Ukraine, and
the draft itself has sparked protests and various forms of draft avoidance,
including bribery and even flight to Russia.
Given the need for increasing the size of Ukrainian forces in eastern
Ukraine by five to six times to completely defeat the insurgents backed by
Russian forces and the related need for the rotation of personnel through
frontline units, such resistance seriously limits the ability of Ukrainian
commanders to function, the Moscow analyst says.
What
is of even greater concern to Kyiv, he suggests, is that resistance among
Ukrainians to military service has grown as losses have mounted, a trend that
would likely continue if the fighting were to intensify still further. One reason for that is that Ukrainian forces
are sufficiently disordered already that those who fight may not even gain
recognition for having done so and the families of casualties may not get
support.
And the Ukrainian authorities may be creating additional
problems for themselves by offering those who protest against Kyiv the
opportunity to avoid charges or convictions by joining the military, a pattern
that could mean that some in Ukrainian uniform may be quite ready to desert or
otherwise disorder Ukrainian lines.
Kruglov
cites the words of Aleksandr Perendzhiyev, an expert of the Russian Association
of Military Political Analysts: “the success of mobilization during war
directly depends on how the population of the country views the necessity [of
the conflict] and thus supports mobilization.”
And
that in turn, Perendzhiyev continues, depends to no small degree on “how just
the system of mobilization” appears to be and how the government takes care of
the wounded and the families of casualties.
On paper at least, Russia’s military system is in better shape – the legal
arrangements are defined – but in reality, Moscow faces serious problems as
well.
The
reason for that, Kruglov says, is that “despite the fact that the Russian armed
forces are by their potential much stronger than the Ukrainian ones,” they too
bear the marks of their origins in the Soviet past. And in the Russian case,
many of “the reforms” that have been carried out in the name of economy have
only exacerbated problems.
For
example, he continues, the number of military commissariats, which serve as
Russia’s draft boards, was cut by 20 times, from 1647 to 81, and their
personnel were almost “completely demilitarized.” That effectively destroyed
the old Soviet system without putting in place an effective new one.
Under
current conditions, Moscow analysts say, the Russian military is “already not
capable of conducting mass mobilization” as demonstrated by the system’s
failure to be able to organize “even modest training” exercises involving
reservists. All such efforts have “ended in failure,” and to conceal that, the
defense ministry has “classified” the results.”
Even
Vladimir Putin’s intervention in June when he called for the activation of the reserves
has not worked well. The results have been far less than were anticipated, in
part because such actions are expensive and the regime is not willing or able
to put the necessary funds at the disposal of the defense ministry.
In
Kruglov’s view, “practice shows, including the latest events in Ukraine, that
not one even strong army today is capable of achieving victory using cadre
military personnel alone.” Reserves must
be called up, but Moscow faces real problems in that regard because the number
of its cadres units was cut by 80 percent and thus cannot form the nucleus of a
Russian force.
Moreover,
he continues, Russia has failed to set up the kind of strategic reserves any
prolonged conflict requires. That means, Kruglov says, that the Russian
military will not be in a position “to wage a successful war with a serious
opponent even within the limits of its own borders.”
But
there is no going back to the “archaic Soviet system of mobilization,” Kruglov
suggests, not only because war has changed and made professionalism more important
but also because society has changed and is less deferential to the demands of
the military. Both those developments will make the mobilization of a Russian
military for war more difficult.
More
money and time needs to be put into the development of the reserves and their
maintenance as a fighting force by providing “a minimum” training periods every
six months. “Otherwise,” the “Sovershenno Sekretno” writer says, “in the course
of military actions, reservists will become ‘cannon fodder’” and little else.
Russian
commanders recognize this and have pushed for such a system, one that would
copy the American version. But there has been no willingness on the part of the
Russian political leadership to support that, Kruglov says. And again the
reason almost certainly is money and the government’s unwillingness to divert
it from other goals to the military.
Such
arguments against investment in the reserves always seem compelling during
peacetime, Kruglov suggests, but they have all too obvious and negative
consequences if and when a country goes to war.
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