Paul
Goble
Staunton, November 14 – The situation
with regard to Russia’s birthrate is much worse than officials say, Igor
Gundarov says. It is not easily correctible as some think but rather reflects a
“cascading demographic” decline that now represents the main threat to the
national security” of the country.
The specialist on health care
administration at the Sechenov Moscow State Medical University says that
officials want Russians to believe that the reduction in births this year
reflects “economic factors” like Western sanction, falling incomes, and the
deteriorating situation in health care (ng.ru/kartblansh/2017-11-14/3_7114_kartblansh.html).
If that were the
case, Gundarov continues, correcting the situation would be relatively easy;
but in fact, the situation reflects a deeper set of problems that no one can
reverse quickly. Low birth numbers now reflect low numbers of births 18 to 20
years ago when those who now should be giving birth were born.
Because the size of that cohort was
small, that alone, he points out, “leads to a reduction in the number of
marriages and a consequent reduction of births, the first cascade.” That in
turn sets the stage for another decline 18 to 20 years from now. And so on and
so forth every two decades for as far into the future as experts can
project.
And that in turn has a devastating
impact on the number of working age Russians who are declining by a million a
year at present. “If in 2010,” Gundarov
says, “there were 88.9 million” working age Russians, in 2016, there were only
82.3 million.” Losses of a million workers a year represents “the most
fundamental form of demographic [and hence economic] collapse.”
Another sign of this collapse is the
striking reduction in the number of unemployed from 6.3 million in 2009 to 4.1
million in 2016. Given the large number of firms that have gone bankrupt and
reductions in the number of employed at many others, one would have expected
the number of unemployed to go up rather than down.
But because the number in prime
working-ago cohorts have declined, there are now two advertised vacancies for
every unemployed. Many union leaders don’t want to believe this but it is a
fact: “unemployment is falling while vacancies are growing,” an indication of a
fundamental demographic problem.
Leaders like Dmitry Medvedev present
these figures with pride, Gundarov says; but if they were being honest, they
would be forced to recognize that the working-age population is disappearing
more rapidly than are workplaces. If that were not the case, he argues, “the
number of unemployed would be 10 to 12 million,” not four.
Doing anything about the demographic
“cascade” Russia finds itself in “will be extraordinarily difficult.” As a
result, Gundarov continues, one must face the fact that the country faces “demographic
and socio-economic degradation.” By mid-century, there will be five times fewer
Russians in their 20s than there were in 1988.
“The Russian people will exist for
long years beyond that,” he says, “but not with the status of a geopolitical
subject. It will live in a hospice,” and
the international community will enter the indigenous population of Russia “into
the Red Book of History” for those who are at risk of dying out.
Ever more people are beginning to
recognize this problem, but they don’t know what to do. Migration is no
solution, not least because other CIS countries face the same problems Russia
does and will work hard not to let their people leave and work elsewhere. Maternal capital won’t work either.
And “even our official pride – the increase
in life expectancy to 71.9 years elicits a smile in comparison with our nearby
neighbors: Azerbaijan and Armenia have life expectancies of 75, Belarus 74,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 73, and Kazakhstan and Moldova 72. “After us,” Gondarov
says, “is only Ukraine with a life expectancy figure of 71.9.”
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