Paul
Goble
Staunton, November 9 – The Russian
revolution, the drive to transform the country from “an imperial form of an
oprichnik-autocratic system to an analogue of a European nation state, did not
begin in 1917 and has not yet been completed, according to St. Antony’s College
historian Vladimir Pastukhov.)
Understood in this way, three things
become obvious, he suggests. First, “the results of the Russian revolution and
the results of Bolshevism are not one and the same thing, and therefore it is
still too early to sum them up;” but one can say that 1917 made a contribution to the real revolution
even if it did not achieve that drive’s goals (republic.ru/posts/87530).
Second, revolution understood in
this way “is written into the logic of Russian history and is thus one of the
seven main events” in the history of the country on the same level as the
beginning of the formation of the Moscow-centric state or the transformation of
that government into an imperial one by Peter the Great.
And third, 1917 is part of a larger
stream of events: “In the 20th century, Russia experienced at a
minimum four revolutions and approximately as many ‘palace coups.’” It must be
considered in terms of this tradition rather than being viewed as something
unique or set apart from history.
Such an understanding of 1917 allows
for a better understanding of what is occurring in Russia now, Pastukhov
suggests. Vladimir Putin is trying to
stop this process, “but from the point of view of history, this does not mean
anything because the Russian revolution will strive to realize its goal in
their full extent, despite resistance.”
“Sooner or later,” the Russian
historian says, “the flood will break the dam.
This is only a question of time.” But there is one important aspect of
the current situation that needs to be kept in mind: “if the catastrophe of
1917 was a kind of ‘stress test’ of Russian history, then the future
catastrophe could turn out to be its ‘crash test.’”
That is because once again after an
event that appears to promise radical change, forces have emerged to bring back
the old content albeit in new forms’ but the fact that new forms are put in
place may be a positive step even if the content isn’t. As Viktor Chernomyrdin once brilliantly
observed, Pastukhov continues, “it was never this way, but here is it again!”
“The political goal of the Russian
revolution” understood in broadest terms was “the removal of autocracy and the establishment
of a Russian version of a nation state,” Pastukhov says. But the events of 1917
“were not able to achieve this end.” Very quickly, “after the beginning of the
revolution, the autocratic pattern restored itself in new dress.”
For
a brief period between 1989 and 1993, it appeared that the goals of the
revolution might be achieved; but such hopes were soon destroyed. Now, the
historian says, “present-day Russia as never before resembles not so much the
USSR with its totalitarianism as tsarist Russia during the era of decay with
its political eclecticism.”
That
is, the current system combines “unceasing repressions with relatively free
political activity” and “with relatively great, compared with Soviet times,
freedom of speech and the press.” Thus, “over the course of a century, Russia
has traversed a political circle without having achieved any additional
political value.”
And
as a consequence, it faces the very same tasks it did a century ago but must
try to fulfill them “in new cultural and political conditions,” Pastukhov
argues. One of those new conditions is that the Soviet system put in place
certain ideas which are important to the achievement of the revolution’s goals
even if it never gave them real content.
“Often
in the details is hidden not only the devil,” he continues, because “while the
revolution did not resolve the task of eliminating autocracy … it laid out the
main directions of the solution” of that problem: “republicanism, federalism
and parliamentarianism” even though it did not develop them as needed.
The
“Soviet project,” he says, did not allow any of these three to acquire the
meaning required by the underlying principles of the Russian revolution and so
each of them must now be addressed anew.
First,
republicanism. “Taking into
consideration the Russian political tradition of personalization and
sacralization of state power, a nation state in Russia can exist only in a
republic form.” That the Soviet system was predicated on that was and remains “the
main political achievement of the Soviet project.”
In
a republic, Pastukhov points out, it is ultimately easier to achieve the
division of secular and spiritual powers (religious and ideological) without
which all other forms of the division of power (legislative, executive and
judicial) lose practical significance.”
Second,
federalism. “In its current territorial-state organization, which in fact
remains unchanged since Catherine’s time, Russia cannot exist in any other form
besides the autocratic one, that is in the form of a super-centralized state
with a hyper-personalized power having sacred status.”
“Therefore,
all attempts to ‘democratize’ Russia while preserving the existing
territorial-state system and the redistribution of the functions of the center
to the territories are a political utopia.” Without changing the former, the
latter will not change whatever Russians choose to call their ruler, “emperor,
general secretary or president.”
Only
genuine federalization, with “15 to 20 large territorial formations capable of
being independent subjects of a new federation” will give Russia the chance to
achieve this goal of the Russian revolution. Otherwise it will simply go on and
on in the same vicious circle of autocracy. But to achieve that will be “unbelievably
complicated and risky.”
And
third parliamentarianism. Only a parliamentary system will allow the interests
of the regions and the population to play the role needed to transform the
country while being flexible enough to prevent one or another part of it from
wanting and seeking to leave, the Russian historian continues.
In
short, what is needed is “a United States of Eurasia.” Indeed, after the Putin period is ended
sooner or later, this is the only arrangement that will allow Russia to remain
a single country and be democratic and free at the same time. Until that
happens, “the Russian revolution [will] not go anywhere.”
What
Russians are seeing now is the revolution “in a negative form as the Russian
counter-revolution, the active phase of which began in 2013-2014.” In the
future, there are really only “two global scenarios for the development of
Russia in the 21st century – braking or accelerating the revolution.”
The
first, which is on offer now, is “the more probable” but “the longer it
continues, the fewer chances Russia will have to remain a single sovereign
state.” The second is must less likely
because its achievement will require traversing “an extraordinarily difficult
and risky path and require unbelievable application of effort of the entire
Russian people and great courge from the political elites.”
But,
Pastukhov concludes, “this is the only path which will allow the Russian
revolution to make a soft landing and not crash into the ground.”
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