Paul
Goble
Staunton, November 10 – “The
identity of a great power and historical memory about its imperial inheritance
in combination with the desire to bring together ‘a divided nation’ can be a
dangerous cocktail, especially if people propose a forcible solution of the
issue,” according to Aleksey Miller, a professor of St. Petersburg’s European
University.
That combination already exists in
Russia, has been encouraged if not actively promoted by Vladimir Putin, and is
gaining acceptance among many Russians, a situation that obviously threatens
Russia’s neighbors but also if less obviously Russia itself, the scholar
continues (globalaffairs.ru/number/Irredentizm-i-krizis-natcionalnoi-identichnosti-19125).
In an interview in the current issue
of Rossiya v globalnoy politike,
Miller discusses the irredentism and argues that in Russia’s case, “all the
dangers arising from a powerful identity of a great power and from its imperial
heritage which tempts some to view present-day borders as ‘accidental’ and
‘unjust’ are combined with nationalism. And this is a very dangerous mix.”
“When such strivings become an
important part of ideology and play a role in the construction of identity,”
the St. Petersburg scholar continues, “then at a certain moment it is possible
to simply lose control over them.” And that is especially true if leaders
appear to be giving such views legitimacy either by their statements or their
actions.
After his 2007 Munich speech, Puitn
was asked by Dmitry Kiselyov whether it was not time to declare Russians “a
divided nation” and take action. Putin responded not by saying that people
should stop talking such nonsense but rather by suggesting that “one need not
talk about this at the top of one’s voice.” That encouraged many.
And the Kremlin leader’s actions
regarding Crimea did even more, Miller suggests. That event also led to a redefinition for
many of the Russian world. Prior to Crimea, many had accepted Patriarch Kirill’s
definition of that as a region where Moscow should promote cultural values by
soft power. After Crimea, “there was no place for such talk.”
But there was another side to this question
as well, and it has created problems in Russia, Miller says. “In 2014, many considered that Crimea was the
beginning of a big move, ‘a Russian spring’ but with time it became clear that
this is not the case.” And consequently, it became obvious that there needed to
be a reformulation of the concept of “’the Russian world.’”
What was needed but what many have
resisted is a return to the definition Patriarch Kirill had offered earlier, of
the Russian world as a cultural and non-aggressive construction. But many were not interested in going back to
that, and this has become a problem for the Russian state.
That is especially the case because
of the promotion by the authorities of World War II as the center of national identity,
a militant position that means the Russian world has become like a suitcase
without a handle, too important to discard but too difficult to carry. What is
needed, Miller suggests, is to look inside the suitcase and find out what
should be saved and what let go.
The issue of a union of Russia and
Belarus is “in part an irredentist problem, but in general, this issue is much
wider.” It involves “nationalism, identity, relations to the past, historical memory,
and much else besides. Addressing
Russian communities elsewhere by territorial change is another matter altogether
as Ukraine has shown.
Any Russian policy of reuniting
irredentas in a territorial way, especially when there are “notes in the spirit
of Molotov,” clashes with Russia’s interests in cooperating with China or the
West. At the very least, it will make it extremely difficult for Russia to
present itself as “a supplier of security in Central Asia” and elsewhere.
Promoting the resettlement of
Russians from abroad into Russia is another matter, but going beyond that to
challenge borders entails real risks, the European University professor says. Unfortunately, Moscow has done a very poor
job in promoting the return of compatriots from abroad because it demands that they
show how they will be “needed” by Russia.
That shouldn’t be done, Miller says.
Someone who applies to return “simply has the right to do so because he is a
Russian. No tin the sense that his father and mother are Russians but that he
himself is Russian.” Jews who want to resettle in Israel aren’t asked to show
how they are “needed” by Israel, and Russians who want to resettle in Russia
shouldn’t be asked that either.
If one defines irredentism “in the very
broadest sense” as “a striving to ‘save’ the members of one’s people who are
located beyond state borders, then this is a type of irredentism, but it is
about resettlement” rather than changing borders. That is something Russians
need to understand and act upon.
No comments:
Post a Comment