Moscow No Longer Trusts MVD in Non-Russian Republics, Ukrainian Analyst Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 15 – Moscow no longer trusts interior ministry forces in non-Russian republics and thus is beefing up its Russian Guard to handle any challenge to the center’s control, Taras Step says. If that is not enough, the Kremlin is prepared to send in regular army forces.

            In an assessment of the North Caucasus today, the Ukrainian analyst says that this is one of the indications that the situation in the North Caucasus in particular is becoming so close to the boiling point that it may represent “the beginning of the collapse of Russian statehood” (lb.ua/world/2018/11/12/412150_severniy_kavkaz_stanet_li_region.html).

            Over the last two months, there have been serious challenges to the status quo in Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Ingushetia and Stavropol kray, Step says, arguing that these should not be viewed in isolation from each other or the country as a whole. Instead, he insists “the North Caucasus is a reflection of all-Russian trends.”

            That is because what is happening in the federal subjects there is “one of the elements of the gradual deepening of the systemic crisis in Russia and confirms the tendency when socio-economic dissatisfaction of the population is being transformed into political protests against the existing authorities.”

            Even as the economy gets worse, Step says, the traditional Russian mechanisms for controlling the situation – reliance on local authorities, propaganda, administrative-police measures and the like – “are losing their effectiveness.” In the North Caucasus, the only “serious restraining factor” now is the money subsidies Moscow provides regional governments.

            The Ukrainian analyst says that the recent events in the North Caucasus call attention to five trends that are spreading across Russia and deepening “the destructive processes in the domestic policy of Russia.”  These include:

·         First, “the socio-economic problems of the population are gradually shifting into the political realm,” as people are ever less convinced that those in power are going to be able to turn the situation around.

·         Second, “the efforts of the active part of the population are directed not at the struggle with the regime of Vladimir Putin but toward the resolution of local problems.” In the short term, that helps the Kremlin; in the longer, it will lead these same people to turn their attention on the powers that be in Moscow.

·         Third, “the regional authorities of the Russian Federation absolutely cannot solve political-economic issues.” The Kremlin controls too many levers, but that control isn’t solving the problems people in the regions face. Instead, Step says, it is making the situation in many cases far worse – and people are increasingly seeing that is the case.

·         Fourth, people are increasingly aware that “the central powers that be in the Russian Federation do not really want to solve existing problems.” They simply want to keep power. Earlier, they would at least give the impression that they were addressing the problems. Now, they increasingly try to prevent the media from covering developments.

·         And fifth, “the Russian Guard has finally been formed as the main force resource of the Kremlin for suppressing major popular protests.” In recent times, local MVD units “ignored demands of the central powers to ‘disperse’ the protesters” and even showed that they were on the side of the people rather than the regime. 

            “It is interesting,” Step says, “that such a situation is characteristic for all the republics of the North Caucasus. And the Kremlin sincerely believes that in the case of a serious sharpening of the domestic situation in the Russian Federation, the territorial subdivisions of the MVD could come out against the central power.”

            Given that danger, it is building up the Russian Guard because that force is “not connected with the local population and the leadership of the regions,” the Ukrainian analyst argues. If the Russian Guard isn’t enough, he says, Moscow is ready to bring in units of the regular army as it did at the end of Soviet times.

            Moscow does not face such a threat in the immediate future, Step suggests. Its money still matters too much. But if that runs out and over time even if it doesn’t, the situation could deteriorate rapidly and the destruction of Russian statehood could “begin precisely with the North Caucasus.