Belarusian Diaspora in Russian Federation Highlights Differences Between Belarusians and Russians

Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 2 – Many Russians, including Vladimir Putin, believe that Belarusians are so similar to Russians that they will dissolve in the larger community, but the experience of the roughly 500,000 Belarusians in the Russian Federation since 1991 calls such beliefs into question.

            Indeed, Russian journalist Vsevolod Shimov says in a commentary for the RuBaltic portal that Belarusians in the Russian Federation, while they can “easily integrate” into the Russian nation, often do not but instead stress their distinctiveness and even serve as an “ethnic lobby” for Minsk (rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/03012020-gde-v-rossii-zhivut-belorusy/).

            Belarusian diaspora life in the West, he says, is dominated by nationalists who stress the distinction and hostility between Belarusians and Russians. That is not the case with Belarusians in the Russian Federation. But “the Belarusian state has been interested in supporting the self-consciousness of its compatriots in Russia and preventing their complete dissolution.” 

           

            As a result, “Belarusian national organizations are active not only in Moscow and St. Petersburg but in regions of Russia, including [occupied] Crimea, Irkutsk oblast and so on.”  Given Moscow’s importance for Minsk, the presence of “its own lobby” inside Russia “is acquiring particular importance for the Belarusian state.”

            Indeed, Shimov says, “the diaspora is becoming one of the instruments of lobbying the interest of official Minsk.”  However “paradoxical” it may sound, Russia has made it relatively easy for Belarusian nationalists to influence the Belarusian diaspora by promoting the creation of ethnic organizations that inevitably promote a sense of separateness.

            That can be seen in the activities of the Belarusian diaspora in Irkutsk where its members routinely march under the white-red-white flag of the nationalists and take part in what Shimov chooses to call “ethnographic festivals” (see belaruspartisan.by/life/212403/).

            The situation and role of the Belarusian diaspora in Crimea have become especially noteworthy since the 2014 annexation of that peninsula by Russia.  Minsk has not recognized the annexation as legitimate although the Belarusian community on the peninsula has.  And the Belarusian diaspora in Crimea has been more enthusiastic about the union state than Minsk.

            But Shimov continues, “it is extremely probable that the organization serves as a channel of unofficial communication between Belarus and the Crimean authorities under conditions of the lack of official recognition and the ‘multi-vector’ maneuvering of Minsk.” At the same time, the diaspora in this case wants some things Minsk doesn’t.

            The diaspora would like to see the restoration of rail  connections between the peninsula and Belarus, something Minsk has avoided lest it fall under Western sanctions or anger Kyiv (ria.ru/20191229/1562987538.html). It can’t be excluded, however, that Minsk is using the diaspora to test the waters on this issue as on others.

            Three things make Shimov’s article intriguing and important. First, it is a rare example of the positive coverage by a pro-Kremlin site of a phenomenon that calls into question Putin’s ideological position. Second, it suggests that Belarusians living in Russia may become more Belarusian than even those who live in Belarus, a warning to those calling for unification of the two countries.

            And third, it may very well be an indication that the Kremlin is now focusing on the role of such diaspora groups and plans a crackdown, having chosen one that it not unreasonably from its position assumes will attract few supporters in the West and thus make it easier for Moscow to begin this process.