Both Russian Society and the Putin Regime Changed in Six Ways in 2019, Shelin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 2 – A year ago, the Putin regime hoped that Russian society would return to where it was before the pension reform undermined its basic support for the regime, but that did not happen. Instead, Sergey Shelin argues, there have been six fundamental changes in Russian society and six equally fundamental shifts in the powers that be. 

            The regime expected that outbursts of anger would rapidly die out on their own as had been the case earlier, but when that did no happen, the Rosbalt commentator says, it became obvious to the regime that it was facing a new situation and that it would have to use different methods to maintain itself (rosbalt.ru/blogs/2020/01/02/1820702.html).

            Six developments in the protests of Russian society have been especially striking, Shelin says. They include:

1.      “the insignificance of the issues involved” and the likelihood that the authorities could have made concessions without real cost to themselves;

2.      “the absolutely peaceful character of all actions wherever they took place;”

3.      “the growing ability of the masses to get by without leaders;”

4.      “the outburst of social solidarity” with “the stormy growth of the infrastructure of support for those under arrest;”

5.      “the ability of the protesters to influence the outcome of the conflict, even in a modest way;” and

6.      “attempts to organize all-national support of local protests … They weren’t large but earlier there weren’t any.”   

“All this says that in 2019, Russian society slightly revived and began to remember its rights. But the regime, while understanding this carried out and with growing energy its own program of easures directed at driving out of the public field any competitors.” This also took the form of six points, Shelin says. In response to societal changes, the regime sought to:

1.      “isolate and discredit existing and potential critics;

2.      “instill certainty in the judicial machine and remind the public that it has no way to retreat;”

3.      “or, if the regime has no alternative but to make concessions to the masses of protesters, to repress their leaders at the same time;”

4.      “not to allow a coming together of Moscow and regional opposition figures into an all-national force;”

5.      “to identify activists of the new generation and visit crushing strikes on them;” and

6.      “in order to cleanse the political field, to boldly sacrifice systemic liberals and systemic opposition figures.” 

Thus, Shelin writes, “in 2019, two plans collided: the plan of society which wanted to play some role in its own country and the plan of the regime which did not want to see in the country anything except itself and which to that end was prepared to take ever more adventurist steps.”

Neither side fully won, he concludes; and “the fight will continue in 2020.”