Eurasianism at 100 on the Brink of New Upsurge, Dzermant Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 9 – 2020 is the centenary of two competing ideas about the organization of much of the world, pan-Europeanism which led to the formation of the European Union but now is in decline, and Eurasianism which originated in response to Bolshevism, was persecuted by the Soviets, but now is set to triumph, Aleksey Dzermant says.

            For most of the last 75 years, pan-Europeanism appeared to be the victor in this competition; but now the reverse is true, the Belarusian scholar says. Pan-Europeanism has run out of steam, but Eurasianism is a set of ideas and approaches whose time has come thanks to changes in Russia  and elsewhere in Eurasia (imhoclub.lv/ru/material/evrazijstvo_novogo_veka).

            Over the course of the last three decades, Dzermant says, “Eurasianism has become in the framework of Russian and other cultures close to that one a powerful intellectual tradition.” It isn’t the only one and it “has not become the ruling idea of an ideocratic state as its founding fathers dreamed.” But “Eurasianism is if not mainstream then at least popular and recognized.”

It has become “an inalienable element of contemporary Russian identity and geopolitical practice. And in this is the main result of the fist Eurasian century.” Equally important, Dzermant says, is the role it has played in softening the transition from Soviet to post-Soviet times by providing a bridge between the two.

                But for Eurasianists, the most important thing is that “the Eurasian program minimum has been fulfilled: the Eurasian Economic Union has been formed and despite all problems and shortcomings it is functioning quite well.” Moreover, Eurasianism is serving as the basis for “integrating the various ethno-cultural and religious elements” in Russia “into a single nation.”

            More broadly, Eurasianism has proved itself to be “a natural conceptual structure in the framework of which it is possible to avoid the extremes of ethnic nationalism and failed multi-culturalism which were creating ghettos and closed off diasporas” not only in the Russian Federation but in its neighbors.

            “In Kazakhstan,” he writes, “Eurasianism is the only real alternative to nationalist pan-Turkism, Islamic fundamentalism and illusory Westernism, which allows for the preservation of national accord and its own identity.”

            “In Belarus,” Dzermant says, Eurasianism has become “a necessary counterweight to Europeanism which has a tendency to strengthening especially among the young,” something that carries with it the risk of a shift of geopolitical orientation, the loss of basic markets and the destruction of the state.”

And “in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, participation in Eurasian integration is practically the only cahcne for economic growth, the overcoming of narrowly national horizons and isolation which do not give any opportunities for development.” Building on all these things is now a technical question as the basic ideological understanding has been achieved.

The next step, he suggests, is “the formation of a super-national Eurasian bureaucracy” which will “nurture and cultivate a common Eurasian identity that will add to and broaden the national identities” of its component peoples. The only basis for this is “’soft force,’” including public diplomacy and cultural exchange. 

According to Dzermant, “the future Eurasian Union must acquiree aspects of political and military unions, but the national elites must grow to the understanding of delegating and unifying sovereignty. Otherwise they will not preserve their power and statehood and not ensure the security of themselves and the citizens of their countries.”

Russia and its Eurasianists must develop programs to counter China’s expansion and ultimately draw in China to a Eurasian Union.  They must also do the same thing with Europe, although the process for that will likely take longer.  But Moscow must focus on its own population in particular.

“Now is the time to assemble the building blocks. But the time is coming when the structure can be erected. Russia and Russian culture and identity have the potential for growth; and after a conservative pause which cannot last long, they must enter a new phase of breakout, which will have a technological, economic, geopolitical and cultural dimension.”