Lubyanka Shooting has Done to Putin what Chernobyl Did to Gorbachev, Zapolsky Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 3 – Mikhail Gorbachev “lost his power not in 1991” as many think but in 1986, when, in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, he did not immediately understand the extent of that tragedy but accepted the reports of his subordinates that everything was under control, Dmitry Zapolsky says.

            The author of Putinburg says something similar has happened to Vladimir Putin in the wake of the shooting at the Lubyanka because that act of violence like the atomic power plant accident of 1986 showed that the system isn’t working effectively and the man on top is isolated (mnews.world/ru/putin-ne-budet-prezidentom-reshenie-o-preemnike-prinyato/).

            Zapolsky tells Galina Ostapovets of MNews that the attack on the Lubyanka was “a very important signal to the Russian establishment that the FSB will not defend the regime in the case of an unforeseen development of events if it cannot even defend itself” against “fanatic opponents” like the gunman in this case.

            “If even the FSB cannot defend its own entrance despite its enormous budget, then it is clear that something very incorrect is taking place in the governmental system of Russia” and that “there is no certainty that [its] rockets will fly or that in general there exists any sort of military coordination,” the writer continues.

            “Literally a few days before the terrorist action at the FSB headquarters the aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, burned. And near St. Petersburg,” officials uncovered an arms cache that had been built up by “the insane man who raped his own daughter and was married to her sister.” 

            “Where is all this agent network” the authorities are always talking about? This man “had been building up his arsenal undisturbed for “eight years.” All of this, Zapolsky argues, points to “the growing ineffectiveness of the administrative system. 

            The terrorist act, he continues, was directed “not only at Putin personally but at the entire ruling class. Consider this from the point of view of a Russian bureaucrat who is certain that the system is stable and will defend him, his children and his family. And here all of a sudden, he sees that it is ineffective.”

            It is increasingly obvious that “Putinism in its current configuration is ineffective” because “if the FSB is ineffective, then everything is because the special services protect the powers, above all with information.” Those who control the information flow to Putin have been shown to not be in control of the situation.

            This leaves Putin with few good options, Zapolsky says.  Given that his regime functions only when there are shocks arising either from wars abroad or repressions at home, the coming years are certain to be a time of turbulence. But now after the Lubyanka incident, everyone can see that “the powers that be are not ready for serious opposition.”

            “The regime immediately needs rebranding,” the writer says, “under which, the system of Putinism will remain in the form of post-Putinism. This will be a quite long and complicated situation, but Putin has made clear that he is ready to change the system and will not hold onto presidential power until the end.”

            “This is natural,” Zapolsky says; “he is aging before our eyes.” Like the story about the aging John D. Rockefeller in the 1930s who was given to read a newspaper printed in one copy only for him, Putin now “sees the world and he wants to,” but “after his recent press conference, elites understood the transition has been declared and the new president most likely will be Medvedev.”

            But it is a mistake to think about this process as consisting of a single act, the writer argues. “Remember,” he says, how long the transition was after the death of Stalin through Beria, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and so on.

            Asked about relations with Ukraine, Zapolsky says that Crimea is likely to undergo a process like “North Cyprus-ization.” If Putinism collapses, “Crimea will have the chance to become an autonomy within Russia and then become a separate state. Its return back to part of Ukraine without blood and enormous losses unfortunately is impossible.”

            “The deportation of pro-Russian ‘patriots’ from Crimea, like the Sudenland Germans, will destroy the rickety steps of Ukraine toward Europe, and the Putinists understand this perfectly. But without Europe, Ukraine is already impossible.” Putin understood from the outset that “Crimea will be a phantom wound of the Ukrainian people for a long time to come.”

            “It cannot come to terms with the annexation, but you can’t get back a leg that has been amputated.” As for the Donbass, this is and will remain “a frozen conflict,” with the intensity of fighting declining. At present, “Putin is more concerned with Lukashenka than with Zelensky, and more focused on Belarus and its integration with Russia than on the Donbass.”

            More generally, Zapolsky concludes, “the internal destabilization of Russia will only grow” as a result of Putin’s actions in Ukraine.  The Kremlin leader will not achieve his goals there save one: “he will not allow Ukraine to join NATO and the European Union,” showing Russians that overthrowing a corrupt regime won’t improve things but only make them worse.