Window on Eurasia: Seven False Fears Putin Uses to Keep Russians behind Him

Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, January 4 – Many commentators have suggested that Vladimir Putin’s high ratings are the result of the climate of fear his authoritarian regime has imposed the Russian population, but Daniel Kotsubinsky argues that an even more powerful means has been the spread of seven “false fears” about what might happen if the Kremlin leader were replaced.

 

            In a Livejournal.com post yesterday, the commentator lists these seven and then explains why each is false, something he says opponents of Putin and Putinism must recognize and thus be prepared to call for the “immediate” departure from office of the incumbent Russian president (kotsubinsky.livejournal.com/447527.html).

 

            First, he says, Russians fear that “if Putin is overthrown … he will be replaced by someone similar only much worse: Kadyrov, Medvedev, Shoigu, Ivanov, Petrov, Sidorov and so on.”  But that is false. “In the event of a political revolution,” Putin will be followed into retirement by “all his ‘vertical.’”

 

            Second, Russians fear that “if not Putin, then who?”  That, Kotsyubinsky says, is “a false dilemma.” The real question is “not ‘who’ but ‘what.’”  What is needed is the replacement of the presidential system with a parliamentary one in which the president plays a “purely representative role” as in most European countries.

 

            Third, Russians fear that “if Putin goes, chaos and civil war will begin in the country.” But “that is not the case.”  When the USSR fell apart, a much bigger “political catastrophe,” that didn’t happen. When the Maidan occurred, it didn’t. And “there is no basis to suppose that at the beginning of the 21^st century, Russian voters and political elites … will suddenly turn to ‘axe,’ burn landlords’ palaces or ‘beat the Jews.’” That didn’t happen in 1991 and won’t now.

 

            Fourth, Russians fear that “if Putin goes, the communist-fascists will come to power and arrange things their way.”  That is absurd. Such groups won’t make it to power. Despite fears of that in Ukraine, it didn’t happen there, and it won’t happen in Russia. The majority of Russians aren’t going to vote for Nazis and radical communists.

 

            What’s more, Kotsyubinsky says, is “that the single force which is spreading xenophobia and national imperial ambitions in the country now is the Kremlin. By its actions, it is itself multiplying the popularity of those marginal groups which it then uses to frighten residents. If the ‘power vertical’ goes, so too will the fear of the ‘communist-fascist revenge.’”

 

Fifth, Russians fear that “if Putin goes, there will be a war!” As a result, they are prepared to put up with him in order to avoid a war.  But that too is false. In fact, “war – cold and hot – is de facto becoming an inalienable attribute precisely of Putin’s policy.” He needs more than ever “an outburst of irrational patriotism” to maintain himself.

 

Putin’s departure, Kotsyubinsky says, “would mean an instantaneous reduction of international tension and the return of Russia to peaceful diplomatic means of all disputes,” exactly the opposite of what Putin and his people say.

 

Sixth, Russians fear that “if Putin goes, the Russian economy will immediately collapse and ‘soon we will all starve.’”  Such a fear is “hopelessly” out of date, the commentator says. In fact, Putin and Yeltsin before him have built a system based on oil and gas sales alone, and with Putin’s departure, Russia can move toward an economic model in which all will benefit.

 

And seventh, Russians fear that “if Putin goes, Russia will disintegrate.”  That fear, he says, is based on memories of what happened to the USSR in 1991.  But it ignores the fact that “no one dismembered the Soviet Union by force” and that Russians like many others benefited from separating from those who they felt were blocking their development.

 

Of course, Kotsyubinsky says, the problem of national minorities exists, “but this problem exists in Europe as well, and it is completely possible to resolve it by political means up to and including referenda on independence like what happened not long ago in Scotland.”

 

Russia stands not before “’the threat of disintegration’” but rather before “the task of ‘restoring the constitutional order,’ that is, the creation of a real federation which would give each region the chance to administer itself freely as do the states in the US and the lander in the Federal Republic of Germany.”

 

That some parts of it might want to leave is neither impossible nor that important, he continues. But if the country becomes truly decentralized and also truly attractive to all of its parts, such problems will be reduced to a minimum.

Sadly, Kotsyubinsky adds a postscript which shows that he is not entirely free of perhaps more genuine fears. He notes in conclusion that “everything sad above is not a call for anyone to do anything but simply the fruits of idle New Year’s reflections of a modest private person who is enjoying a holiday table and good music.”