Paul
Goble
Staunton, February 11 – Many
commentators have suggested that Vladimir Putin is leading Russia toward a new
1937, but few have considered the possibility that his repressions might begin
in the provinces and then spread back to the capitals rather than as was the
case under Stalin.
There has been some attention to the
way in which the imposition of Soviet practices in Crimea and in the Donbas
raises that possibility, with Crimean Tatars routinely pointing out that the
occupation authorities have adopted Soviet approaches on many questions and
officials of the self-proclaimed “peoples republics” saying that is exactly
what they want to do.
And those who keep track of official
violations of human and civil rights on sites like SOVA or the Sobkor
information agency (sova-center.ru/ and sobkorr.ru) among others
know that Russian officials outside of Moscow often behave worse than those in
the capital because they assume they can act without attracting the attention
of Western journalists or embassies.
Given that Putin often likes to test
the waters and see how others react and then adjusts his policies accordingly
and given that his much-ballyhooed “power vertical” is nothing compared to
Stalin’s apparatus in the late 1930s, it would be entirely reasonable if
disturbing to think that he might begin a massive crackdown where fewer
outsiders would complain.
In an article posted on Rufabula.com
today and entitled “A New ’37 in Karelia?” Vadim Shtepa, perhaps Russia’s most
distinguished writer on regional issues, not only directly asks whether that
might happen but also points to some of the reasons why Putin’s appointment of
regional heads might dispose them in that direction (rufabula.com/author/shtepa/335).
Shtepa
notes that “in the middle of winter in Karelia,” there have been some
disturbing echoes of “long forgotten sad times.” On January 30, Oleg Fokin, the
chairman of the Petrozavodsk city council, was arrested in what was almost a
Hollywood manner: He was seized on the streets by masked men from the special
department of the interior ministry.
Several
days later, the same thing happened to Devlet Alikhanov, a deputy of the
republic Legislative Assembly and another prominent Karelian politician. Both
of them, Shtepa notes, are “known as active critics of the republic
authorities.” On February 6, their
colleague, Vasily Popov, head of the republic Yabloko Party, called a press
conference to denounce the arrests.
Popov
succeeded in assembling a large number of Karelian journalists, but a
significant share of them, Shtepa said, did not publish anything about what was
said, either because of director censorship by editors of state-controlled
media or because of their own practice of “self-censorship” for self-protection.
The
regional Yabloko party leader called the arrests “political” and connected them
with the incumbent governor Aleksandr Khudilaynen. Popov said that “it is
obvious” that this isn’t the end of the wave of arrests and that he, Popov,
expects to be arrested in retribution for the fact that Yabloko’s candidate won
the Petrozavodsk mayoral elections in 2013.
He
said that the United Russia party and its man, the incumbent governor, have now
decided to “correct their mistake by force” and begin to “cleanse the political
field of Karelia from any opposition forces … if they proceed in that
direction, they will be forced to build new prisons.”
Popov suggested that as a result of this
campaign, “the use of the law enforcement organs in political struggle has
become Karelia’s brand.” Many in Karelia had hoped on the basis of Khudilaynen’s
Finnish name that he would be supportive of the Finnic nations there, but he
has proved very much the outsider he was. Until his appointment, he’d never
worked in Karelia.
Popov has an explanation. When Khudilaynen was
in Gachina, he felt himself to be a marginal outsider in the Leningrad oblast
political elite. Now that he has been given control of an entire republic, he
views the local people as “aborigines” with whom he has no reason to reach an
accord and has engaged in a “shameless” seizure of their properties.
The Yabloko leader says that he is “certain”
that the only way for the republic to avoid a disaster is for it to have the
opportunity to directly elect the governor and then have the right to remove
him. Otherwise, the incumbent will respond only to Moscow and may do even worse
things in Karelia because no one there can touch him and few will notice what
he does.
No comments:
Post a Comment