Paul
Goble
Staunton, February 6 – Like many
countries, the Russian Federation suffers from many regional and ethnic
tensions, any one of which could become a Donbas if an outside power provided it
with assistance, a reality that both Moscow and many in the West appear to have
forgotten, according to Ukrainian commentator Pavel Kazarin.
In a note for Haqqin.az, Kazarin
points out that few regional or ethnic divisions explode into violence unless they
have outside sponsorship such as Vladimir Putin has been providing for small
groups in Donetsk and Luhansk and that if such sponsorship ends, these
conflicts generally are resolved politically rather than militarily (haqqin.az/dictatorship/38587).
Russians “love to say” that the
conflict in the Donbas is “only a civil war” and that “various regions” in
Ukraine could easily follow in its footsteps. But they are less willing to
recognize that “it turns out that exactly such ‘a Donbas’ could be created
somewhere in Penza or Novgorod,” two Russian regions, if they got the same kind
of support Putin is giving.
Kazarin begins his analysis by
pointing out that “no ‘south east’ exists” in Ukraine. What pro-Moscow groups are referring to are “only
several regions of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts,” a small number of urban
agglomerations surrounded by agricultural areas which have “not fallen under
the influence of the separatists.”
Nor have separatist sentiments and
actions spread to other parts of Ukraine, despite the predictions of many in
Moscow, the Ukrainian analyst points out. “Kharkiv and Mykolayev, Odessa,
Zaparozhe, and Kherson all these territories continue to peacefully exist
within Ukraine.”
The portion of the Donbas that has
exploded has done so not so much because of conditions there but because of the
introduction of an outside spark and the continuing support of an outside
power. Indeed, Kazarin continues, the best evidence of that is to be found in
the statements of people like Igor Strelkov.
In an interview to “Zavtra,”
Strelkov, one-time supreme commander of the Donetsk Peoples Republic army, explicitly
said that “if it had not been for his interference, then in the Donbas all
would have been peaceful just as in Kharkiv or Odessa” (zavtra.ru/content/view/kto-tyi-strelok/).
Obviously,
Strelkov feels that his contribution has not been adequately appreciated, but
his words call into question and “de-sacralize” the myth that the Kremlin has
promoted throughout the last year, the myth that the Donbas was ready to rise
and would have done so regardless of what anyone else did.
After Strelkov’s
interview, Kremlin propagandists went into action to try to contain the
fallout, Kazarin says. “They began to say that yes, Strelkov and his detachment
through the match but if the region as a result of its contradictions had not
been ready to burn, there would not have been a fire.”
“This is
nonsense,” Kazarin says, “because such ‘contradictions’ exist in the most
varied regions of the world but they become military conflicts only if there is
some act of pitiless will.” Consider
Belgium or Quebec or Catalonia. All have
regional interests, even secessionist ones, but in none of these have such attitudes
led to military actions.
“More than
that,” he continues, using the Kremlin’s logic, it would be “possible to
organize a war in any Russian region. For example, in Penza. Or in Vladivostok.
Or in Saransk.” Using that logic, then
it is clear that “any region of the Russian Federation is condemned to war with
the federal center.”
More than
almost any other country, Russia has multiple and serious inter-regional and
inter-ethnic problems. There are conflicts between donor regions and recipient
ones, between the rich and the poor, between the corrupt neo-feudal system and
the increasingly impoverished population. And using the Kremlin’s logic, all
that is needed for a conflagration is a match!
There is even
evidence for this: the actions of the Primorsky kray “partisans” who accused the
Russian interior ministry of illegality and sought to oppose it. They were
eventually caught and imprisoned, but polls showed that almost as many Russians
viewed them as battlers against corruption as criminals and more than one in
five expressed sympathy with them.
Such figures
suggest, Kazarin continues, that “any Russian region could be transformed into
a Donbas. It is sufficient,” he suggests, “to choose a region and send to it
one’s own ‘Igor strelkov’” and then wait for an explosion.
There are of
course some superficial differences between Ukraine and Russia. In Ukraine,
these outside forces “exploited the theme of regional and worldview
distinctions,” while in Russia, one would need to exploit “protests against the
stratification of society, social divisions, and the theme of post-Soviet
nostalgia.”
But the point
is this: all suggestions by Moscow or others that “’if there hadn’t been
Strelkov, there would have been someone else who would have thrown the match’
are false. There are contradictions in any society. But they are less like
gasoline than like TNT” and the latter needs a detonator if it is to explode.
And that
reality calls attention to what is after all the major difference between
Russia and Ukraine: “Ukraine has not exported instability to Russia. But Russia
very much has to Ukraine.”
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