Paul
Goble
Staunton, February 19 – Yesterday,
Vladimir Putin officially recognized passports and other documents issued by
the Donetsk Peoples Republic and the Luhansk Peoples Republic as valid for
entry into and living in the Russian Federation, an action Ukraine and the West
have condemned but that Russian nationalists see as a step toward the
recognition of these “states.”
This latest manifestation of Putin’s
preference for “hybrid” actions, moves that in fact mean one thing but that
offer him plausible deniability in a world increasingly predisposed to accept
alternate facts at least from leaders of nuclear powers, has so many
consequences that not surprisingly it has sparked a huge number of commentaries
in the last 24 hours.
Almost all say that Putin by this action
has raised the stakes in the conflict in Ukraine with some suggesting that it
points to a South Ossetia-style future for the Donbass and others denouncing it
as confirmation of Russia’s occupation of part of Ukraine’s territory (regnum.ru/news/polit/2240709.html,
kasparov.ru/material.php?id=58A94DC705758
and rbc.ru/politics/18/02/2017/58a877f39a79471cde800f53).
Many argue that this represents the end of
the Minsk process and Putin’s “asymmetrical response” to US President Donald
Trump’s declaration that Moscow must return Crimea (gordonua.com/news/war/v-posolstve-ssha-v-ukraine-zayavili-chto-priznanie-rossiey-dokumentov-ordlo-protivorechit-minskim-soglasheniyam-174608.html
and kp.ru/daily/26645.5/3664228/).
And while some in Ukraine are demanding
that Kyiv respond by ending its visa free regime with Russia (dialog.ua/news/111488_1487434509),
others in Russia are celebrating what they say is Putin’s “recognition of the
documents of countries he doesn’t [yet] recognize (forum-msk.org/material/news/12840817.html).
But perhaps the most useful of the initial
responses to Putin’s latest move are two articles today, one by an individual Ukrainian
commentator and a second which assembles the view of several Russian observers
concerning what Putin is trying to do with his latest action and equally
important who are the Kremlin leader’s intended target audiences.
Ukrainian commentator Vitaly Portnikov
says that Putin’s latest move signal to several key audiences that Russia does
not ever intend to leave the Donbass and that Moscow “not only intends to
preserve its control over the occupied territories but to strengthen it” (ru.espreso.tv/article/2017/02/18/nabor_sygnalov_zachem_putynu_pasporta_quotdnrquot_y_quotlnrquot).
“Formally,” Putin’s announcement does not
constitute recognition of either the LNR or the DNR but in fact his recognition
of documents issued by those entities gives Russia “right now several
opportunities for maneuver,” ranging from its proclaimed status “’until the end
of the conflict’” up to full recognition
of the two as independent states or candidates for annexation.
The common feature of all these
possibilities is that Moscow plans to remain and that is “the main signal” to
Kyiv, Portnikov says. Moreover, Putin’s latest move shows that the blockade isn’t
working and that Moscow by allowing people under the control of these entities
to leave is reducing the burden it will have to carry to maintain these two
statelets.
In addition, the Ukrainian analyst says,
this move is “a signal to the West,” one that “reflects the growing
disappointment in Putin” in the new US president Moscow had placed so many hopes
in. By moving in this way now, “Putin is trying to show” that the West cannot
impose any conditions on him that he can’t rapidly respond to by acting on his
own.
Putin’s move is of a piece and was taken
at the same time as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s “idiotic”
statement that Moscow won’t lift sanctions against the EU until the Minsk
accords are fulfilled. This is one more case where the Kremlin wants to achieve
“mirror-like” equality with the West.
But at the same time, Portnikov concludes,
Putin’s action works to Ukraine’s benefit because it proves again something
that ought to be clear to all: “Moscow is not a mediator but a participant in
the conflict and is interested in the creeping annexation of the territory of
others.” And that it can only be blocked from doing so by “energetic pressure
on this cynical participant.”
In Moscow’s Novaya gazeta, journalists Yuliya Polukhina, Olga Musafirova and
Tatyana Vasilchuk both summarize the Kremlin’s argument that the recognition of
these documents is a “humanitarian” move but add that it has a political
component in that it was signed just before a meeting of the Normandy four in
Munich and soon after Trump’s declaration on Crimea (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/02/18/71560-gumanitarnye-motivy-i-politicheskie-prichiny).
Putin’s “partial recognition of the sovereignty
of the self-proclaimed republics is the kind of asymmetrical response so
beloved by Moscow” as it is not “a direct realization of the ‘Ossetian scenario’
… but a clear gesture of political support to the Donbass” and to those in Russia
who want to annex that region.
And one should not ignore “the military
aspect” of what Putin has done, the three Moscow journalists say. Ukrainian forces
have been pressing LNR and DNR units in reach time, and now Moscow will have no
difficulties at all in strengthening them with volunteers from Russia who can
be given Donets passports in any number that may be required.
That this factor may be especially
important now, they write, is suggested by the Friday declaration of DNR leader
that they are ready to use force to “’return’ control over all the territory of
the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts,” even though Putin’s press secretary has
dismissed this as an “emotional” outburst.
Appended to this article are comments
about Putin’s decision from three prominent Moscow writers, Gleb Pavlovsky,
Dmitry Oreshkin, and Aleksey Chesnakov. The last simply comes out in support of
the Kremlin line on Putin’s actions, but the observations of the other two are
worth noting.
Pavlovsky suggests the move is all about
putting pressure on the West, but it also means that those in the LNR and DNR
territories will now be able to move to Russia if they are worried about the
future in which Kyiv might restore control.
As such, it is a signal that under certain circumstances, Moscow is
prepared to withdraw.
That mixed message, he argues, is “very
typical for the Kremlin.” And thus it
may not work as the Russian powers that be hope and expect. It could even blow
up in their faces.
Oreshkin says that
Putin’s move above all is “connected with [the Kremlin leader’s] disappointment
in Trump.” He really expected the new US president would quickly deliver what
he appeared to promise during the campaign, a recognition of Crimea as part of
Russia and a lifting of sanctions against Moscow.
As long as Putin had such hopes, he “conducted
himself” in a more or less careful way. But now he no longer feels the need to
do so given that Trump is clearly damaged goods when it comes to Russia and won’t
be able to make any positive moves toward the Kremlin without suffering
politically at home for doing so.
The Kremlin now is thus animated by
a feeling of disappointment and a desire to show that it can do what it wants.
At the same time, Oreshkin says, by not taking the ultimate step of recognizing
or annexing the two statelets, Putin keeps the possibility of talks alive,
something that will play well in some Western capitals.
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