Paul Goble
Staunton,
September 20 – Given the deterioration of the Russian economy, working class
protests are increasing while middle class ones ebb, a development that makes
it likely that the Kremlin will look back at the 2011-2012 demonstrations with
a certain “nostalgia” given the difficulties it is likely to face in the
future, according to Levada Center sociologist Denis Volkov.
In
an interview in today’s “Novaya gazeta,” Volkov says that as the economy has
deteriorated, ever more people are protesting. Most of them are doing so
locally and without apparent connections to others and explicitly in a “non-political”
way. But both of those things are deceptive, he suggests (novayagazeta.ru/politics/74627.html).
On
the one hand, Russian workers are protesting for the same reasons even if they
are not doing so as a mass movement. That could change quickly in the event of
a real crisis. And on the other, the claims of participants that they are not
engaged in politics is a tactic rather than a reflection of reality: they know
that these economic problems have only political solutions.
In
addition, Volkov suggests, the notion of “good tsar and bad boyars” which the
Kremlin tries to promote only works up to a point. Ever more economic protests
that appeal directly to Putin are usually cited as evidence of the strength of
these views, but they may have the effect of undercutting “the good tsar” if he
can’t solve their problems.
Volkov
points out that protest attitudes reflect both the level of people’s
satisfaction with their lives and the level of legitimacy of the
authorities. Mass protests under Putin
have occurred precisely when his support fell to 60 percent, 2005 and
2011.
The
middle class protests of the latter year, the sociologist continues, have faded
because members of that class have become “tired” of the political system,
viewing it as a failure. And that
together with the actions of the government has led to the demise of umbrella groups
and the division of that protest movement into small groups.
“Under
certain conditions,” Volkov says, the current working class protests “could
take the same forms we observed in 2010 in the Manezh square. But this will
already depend on the participation of civic organizations,” who are under
pressure from the regime. As a result, the protests ahead are likely to be more
uncontrolled and even violent.
The
Kremlin didn’t realize how lucky it was that in 2011, there were “responsible
people” at the head of the demonstrations, people like Boris Nemtsov “did not
allow the storming of the Kremlin which could have ended with unknown
consequences.” Now, there aren’t analogous leaders and organizations. That
means “next time could be different.”
And
that time may come sooner than many expect: all the measures of trust in
leaders are going down, including in Putin. While the regime is preparing to
resist, that may matter less than many think because the problem in the case of
Russia is that “the system itself forces people who earlier were indifferent to
go out into the street” to have any hope of solving their problems.
Stability in Russia “ended with the
crisis in 2009,” Volkov says, and “while it is impossible to speak about the creation
of a massive civic movement for democracy,” the situation today is
fundamentally different than in was a decade ago. Networks are being created, activists are
emerging, and local deputies are getting involved.
Up to now, this is taking place
mostly in the big cities, but things are spreading, and the regime may even now
becoming nostalgic about the protests it worried about so much five years ago.
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