Paul
Goble
Staunton, September 26 – Rumors that
Vladimir Putin plans to create a State Council are widespread, Valery Solovey
says; and the only reason the Kremlin leader would have to take such a step
would be to create a Politburo-like institution that could ensure that the
succession when it comes will be “acceptable for the main groups of the elite
and society.”
The MGIMO
professor and commentator says that in the course of the last two days, he has
frequently been asked about the rumors that a State Council will be created to
replace the position of president (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=57E8C11FED4B4;
on these rumors, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/09/will-russia-soon-cease-to-have-president.html).
According to Solovey, such rumors
have surfaced at various points “for about ten years,” and many of them focus
on the idea of creating a State Council which has as “its closest historical analogue
the Soviet Politburo” which was “a collegial administration,” especially at
times of succession.
Indeed, the Moscow commentator says,
the only thing that makes the creation of a State Council now “sensible” is to
ensure “such a personal succession at the top of the powers that be which would
be acceptable for the main groups of the elite and society.” But that has some
serious consequences, he continues.
“If we begin to move in this
direction politically, in terms of information and in legal relations in the
next few months,” he writes, “this will mean that the problem of succession has
significantly intensified.” And presumably with the creation of such a State
Council, because of the expectations it would create, conflicts over that would
intensify still further.
Further, Solovey says, “such a
cardinal reform of the higher reaches of state power in [Russian] conditions
will inevitably lead to a sharp weakening of what is even without this an
ineffective government apparatus and lead to organizational chaos and political
disinformation.”
While the MGIMO professor doesn’t
say so, his words suggest that any move in this direction would lead many
Russians to conclude that their country was again entering an interregnum, much
like the one Fyodor Burlatsky warned of 34 years ago. (On his 1982 article and
its more recent relevance, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/03/interregnum.html.)
And however accurate such
conclusions may prove, they will lead to expectations of a new time of
troubles, yet another way in which an authoritarian system like Putin’s does
not enjoy one of the chief advantages of a democratic system, the guaranteed
rotation of elites and the rise of new ones as a normal part of life.
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