Paul
Goble
Staunton, September 2 – Non-Russians
from the Caucasus who come to Moscow to study or work are identify themselves
as Muscovites (but not as Russians) far more quickly than do ethnic Russians
from the provinces, Leokadiya Drobizheva says, highlighting a phenomenon that
is often lost sight of in Russian discussions about “persons of Caucasus
nationality.”
Not only does it underscore the fact
that North Caucasians having arrived in Moscow from depressed regions view
Moscow as offering them enormous opportunities for social and economic
advancement, but it highlights as well the real but often less discussed tensions
between Muscovites and Russians beyond the ring road.
The comments by Drobizheva, perhaps
Russia’s most senior and distinguished ethno-sociologist, are offered by Anton
Bredikhin, a specialist on the Caucasus, in a discussion of the very real
problems some North Caucasus migrants in the Russian capital face and that the
authorities must deal with (kavkazoved.info/news/2016/09/01/kavkazskaja-molodezh-v-moskve-problemy-adaptacii.html).
According to Drobizheva and other
experts Bredikhin cites, North Caucasians adapt to Moscow relatively quickly,
with males and those with higher education doing so more quickly than others
and with Dargins and Kumyks fitting into the mores of the city more quickly
than Kabardins and Avars.
Summarizing much
recent Russian research – and his article is heavily footnoted – Bredikhin says
that “young people from the republics of the North Caucasus coming to study and
work in Moscow fall into a multi-national and multi-confessional milieu of the
Russian capital,” bringing with them values and behaviors that many Muscovites
view as “’alien.’”
“On ‘the new Muscovites,’” the
scholar continues, “the capital of the Russian Federation generates a feeling
of euphoria and specialness to the extent that these young people have been
able to leave their native provincial city, aul, kishlak or village. They are
offered broad opportunities, career growth and high pay.”
In their first months, many turn to
diaspora organizations to get their bearings; and their involvement with these
groups both helps them to integrate and also creates among some a new kind of
hostility against the surrounding Russian culture which many of the new
migrants view as effeminate, a view that leads some to stress their
masculinity.
Over time, that dissipates, studies
have found, Bredikhin reports, as the new arrivals make friends and adapt to
Muscovite conditions and conventions. Many say, he continues, that “’here (in
Moscow) it is a million times better than in Azerbaijan and a thousand times
better than in Daghestan.’”
Those who adapt successfully, he
says, often break their relations not only with the diaspora organizations but
also with their former “small” motherlands. They no longer believe that they
have to coordinate everything with their families and clans, a marked contrast
to their views before coming to Moscow.
The religious affiliation of the
migrants plays a key role. Those who are Christians find it easier to fit in
and adapt. Those who are Muslims tend to build bridges less with the Russians
than with other Muslims in the Russian capital from the Middle Volga, Crimea or
Central Asia and stand apart from the Russians.
Those relative few who are Jewish,
Buddhist or Protestant also tend to retain their isolation from Russian
society, Bredikhin says.
He concludes by saying that the authorities
have to be alert to the dangers of radicalization of these groups even when
they identify as Muscovites, that the government must be more pro-active in
explaining the evils of jihad, and that the Russian authorities must build
bridges to these people as the future “professional cadres reserve” for their
home republics.
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