Paul Goble
Staunton,
March 1 – Russia cannot be free as long as it remains a centralized empire,
Vadim Shtepa says, because “’free’ empires do not exist.” If Russia is to
become free, it must either move toward a federal or confederal system or
dissolve into a multiplicity of Russias that will then decide what their
relations with each other may be.
The
regionalist theorist, who edits the Tallinn-based Region.Expert portal, makes
these points in the course of a critical commentary on three recent articles by
Dimitry Savvin, a Riga-based Russian nationalist, who argues that a unitary
Russia based on Russian nationalism is in fact a precondition for a Russian nation
state (region.expert/no-empire/).
In the first of the three articles
Shtepa considers, Savvin argues that Russia needs “exactly the same synthesis
of democracy and nationalism as the East Europeans … employed at the end of the
1980s” (afterempire.info/2019/01/28/savvin-svobodnaya-russia/, discussed at windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/01/free-russia-will-be-national-russia-or.html).
If the East Europeans, Georgia and
Ukraine have been able to use this combination, so too Russia should as well,
Savvin continues. All of these countries
were able to achieve “independence from the Moscow empire,” but that was a
different challenge than Russia faces “qualitatively rather than
quantitatively.”
In opposition to Savvin, Shtepa cites
my 2004 article, “Russia as a Failed State” (bdcol.ee/files/docs/bdreview/bdr-2004-12-sec3-art3.pdf)
in which I argued that “the Russian state became an empire before the Russian
people became a nation As a result, Russia has never been a nation state, based
on a contract between the people and the government. Instead, the Russian people
always has been a state nation whose interests are defined not by itself but by
those in power.”
That situation and practice
continues, Shtepa says, and it is that relationship rather than just the Soviet
experience that is at the root of the problems Russia faces, problems different
in kind from those the Baltic nations and the others faced and responded to.
That alternative Russian experience
was described by Alexander Etkind in his 2011 book, Internal Colonization: Russia’s Imperial Experience, the
regionalist continues. There, the Russian writer argued that various Russian governments
have colonized “not just ‘the national borderlands’ but essentially Russian territories
as well.”
That did not begin in Soviet times,
Etkind says, but rather with the destruction of the Novgorod Republic by the
Muscovite tsars.
“It is indicative,” Shtepa says, that Savvin
doesn’t mention federalism. Instead, he
treats the free Russia he wants to see established as a unitary and centralized
state. But that is to ignore the fact that “the East European peoples typologically
correspond not to ‘Russians in general’ but to Russian regionalists from
Koenigsberg to Vladivostok.”
Savvin argues that Russians are the
same on the basis of his own experiences in various parts of the empire, but
Shtepa says that his own, which also involved living and working in Karelia,
Crimea, Krasnoyarsk Kray, the Komi Republic and Moscow, has led him to be
impressed by and to value “the multiplicity of regional distinctions.”
“From the point of view of a
regionalist,” Shtepa says, “all regions have the right to political status, to
the status of sovereign and equal republics which if they do desire can
conclude among themselves a (con)federal agreement.” Those like Savvin who want
a single unitary state give them no such rights.
In Savvin’s second article, “Regionalism
vs. Neo-Soviet Separatism” (afterempire.info/2019/02/08/regionalizm-neosovetskit-separatizm/
discussed at windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/02/regionalism-separatism-not-same-thing.html),
the Riga-based commentator says that regionalists in effect work for “the
present local quasi-elites.”
That is simply not the case, Shtepa
says. “Regionalists in fact are simply incompatible with the current ‘power
vertical’ because their thinking is completely different. Most of them suggest
that the rebirth of politics as such will occur only with the holding of free
elections in all regions with the participation of all regional parties.”
Such elections have never happened in post-Soviet Russia;
and as a result, Shtepa says, no change of elites has occurred: “the former
members of the CPSU have simply transferred into United Russia.” No genuine regionalists
are to be found among them because regionalists start with democracy as a goal
rather than the maintenance of a centralized and unitary state.
Savvin
does not recognize this. Instead, he creates the scarecrow of regionalists as
the ideological backers of existing regional elites, arguing that there is a
great danger of a repetition of 1991 and “the rise on the territory of the former
empire of new states,” something he and others, including most regionalists, do
not want to see happen.
The
Riga-based Russian nationalist like Aleksey Navalny does favor giving municipalities
more power. So too do regionalists, but unlike Savvin and Navalny, regionalists
recognize as Tatyana Vintsevskaya says (region.expert/navalny)
that the subjects of a federal should be regions.
Like
Navalny, Savvin does not accept federalism. “Fearing ‘the separatism’ of the regions,
the [Russian] opposition proposes to delegate authority to the municipalities
as more secure in a political sense.” That is because for them “the only
political subject is ‘All Russia,’ in the name of which ‘Moscow speaks.’”
And
in his third essay, Savvin addresses a problem which may seem far distant from
questions of federalism but in fact is central, Shtepa says. Talking about nation building in Russia (afterempire.info/2019/02/20/saavin-rysskiy-nacbilding/ discussed at windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/02/to-form-nation-state-russians-must-use.html),
he urges that Russia today reach back to the tsarist system in order to oppose
the Soviet one.
To do so, Savvin argues, Russia
should follow the Greek approach which appealed to Byzantinism with its
combination of church and state in order to overcome the consequences of the anti-Christian
impact of the Soviet system. He says explicitly: “the USSR is our Ottoman yoke.
The Russian Empire is our Byzantium.”
“It is possible that this opposition
was still important for emigres in the 1920s and 1930s,” Shtepa says, “people
who saw this contrast with their own eyes. But today it no longer works – or more
precisely works in a sense completely different than the one recalled by those who
speak about ‘the Russia which we have lost.’”
In fact, it is a variant on the theme
promoted by Russia’s culture minister Vladimir Medynsky who wants to promote
the idea of “the succession of historical development from the Russian Empire
through the USSR to present-day Russia,” by combining the ideas of the Bolsheviks,
the Whites, and the tsars into one single pastiche.
(That Savvin is reaching back to the
pre-World War II emigration for inspiration is suggested, Shtepa argues, by the
fact that he has named his portal in Riga “Harbin,” a city in the Far East
where the Russian Fascist Party was established in 1931. (On this, see John
Stephan’s 1978 study, The Russian
Fascists.))
What is especially strange, Shtepa
says, is that Savvin’s centralist and authoritarian articles have appeared on a
site, After Empire, which until
recently had been informed by a very different set of ideas. Now, it offers
Savvin’s which are not far removed from the imperialists in Moscow and in the central
Russian opposition.
It and they somehow assume as did
their predecessors in 1991 that Russia can be both unitary and free. That is
why both the putschists and the democrats in that year did not want to see a
new union treaty signed. Both wanted to
build “’a Free Russia’ which would become an even more aggressive and
repressive state than the USSR of perestroika times.”
As a result, Shtepa concludes, “instead
of liquidating the empire, its reset happened. And today the Russian opposition
again dreams of ‘entering the Kremlin.’ But this will be only a new spiral of the
empire” unless and until there is either a federal system, a confederal one or
the appearance of multiple Russias.
Both the current powers that be and the
mainstream opposition talk about a free Russia, but there will only be freedom for
“the post-Russian republics” when the empire no longer exists.
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