Paul
Goble
Staunton, September 13 – The
just-completed elections show “the colossal indifference of the majority of
Russian citizens to the electoral procedures the authorities organize” and thus
cast serious doubt on the practical meaning of the 86 percent that the regime
assumes support Vladimir Putin and the regime, according to Fyodor
Krasheninnikov.
The Yekaterinburg political commentary
notes that the Putin regime invariably quotes that sociological studies show
that “86 percent” of Russians support Putin, “but does this majority exist in
any practical sense” and “do the authorities have real influence over such a
colossal mass of residents of Russia and thus are capable of mobilizing this
into support?”
The answer, Krasheninnikov says, is not so
simple; and the results of last Sunday’s voting are “much more interesting than
the results of even the largest polls” (snob.ru/selected/entry/128866).
Polls are “a very good instrument for tracking
the opinions of people in democratic societies,” he suggests, but in Russia,
they are less useful because those taking part “say what they have heard or
read in the media or what they think the authorities would like to hear from
them.”
Elections in Russia “time and again
demonstrate that one cannot speak about such a majority in the population which
the authorities are capable of successfully manipulating.” They are different
than sociological polls in that they “require from a citizen not just to say
something but to complete a number of actions – going to the polling station,
getting a bulletin, and voting.”
If it were the case that the results of
sociological polls showing “the unbelievable popularity” of the government “reflected
the real distribution of forces, then elections and their results should
coincide.” They don’t. Instead, as Krasheninnnikov
points out, most Russians “ignore the elections – and the authorities time
after time are chosen by a controlled minority.”
Some might argue and do that this
indifference of the population about politics represents “passive support of
the existing powers that be, but in a practical sense, it does not give them
anything. More than that, it raises some uncomfortable questions about the true
nature of their legitimacy.”
If the Russian government presented itself
as an ordinary Western-style democracy, participation wouldn’t matter. In the
West, elections are decided by minorities who are capable of mobilizing. But
the Russian regime constantly presents itself as something else, as a
government that enjoys the support of the overwhelming majority of the
population.
If that were true, it should be able to
mobilize them to vote for its candidates, but Sunday’s elections again showed
that it is unable to do so. As a result,
this popular indifference to the regime is not a prop for the regime as some
imagine, but rather “its main headache and a potential milieu for the political
work of the opponents of the existing regime.”
That is all the more so now because the
regime is losing control of the media environment to the Internet which allows
ever more Russians to gain information from sources the regime doesn’t control,
the Yekaterinburg analyst continues.
None of this is a secret to the bureaucrats
in the power vertical. They know that if there are no real opponents to their
candidates, they can win with low participation; but they also know that if
real opponents do appear, they may not be able to control the situation and
ensure that their minority will carry the day. That is what happened in Moscow.
“Of course,” Krasheninnikov says, “the
indifferent citizens most likely aren’t going to become voters for opposition
figures and won’t take part in protest actions; but there is another side to
this coin: they will not at a critical moment come to the defense of the regime
which all these years has ruled in their name and claiming to have their
support.”
The current Russian powers that be
continue to “rule by operating on a comparatively small percent of citizens
whom it is able to mobilize in its support and to bring to the voting booths.
But as the municipal elections in Moscow showed, it is entirely possible that
an organized opposition minority can do this as well.”
If the regime’s support is genuinely
small, he concludes, then the support the opposition will need to topple it is
relatively small as well.
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