Paul
Goble
Staunton, September 11 – Many
observers were surprised that Muslims in Russia staged demonstrations to
protest the mistreatment of Muslims in Myanmar, and others believe the issue is
over following mass arrests in St. Petersburg and Ramzan Kadyrov’s call to end
such protests (echo.msk.ru/blog/echomsk/2052900-echo/
and novayagazeta.ru/news/2017/09/11/135166-kadyrov-prizval-ne-ustraivat-mitingi-v-podderzhku-musulman-myanmy).
But no one should have been
surprised by the protests because they were never about Myanmar, and no one
should think that the danger of Muslim activism has passed, according to
various Russian analysts with whom Ruslan Gorevoy of the Novaya Versiya portal spoke (versia.ru/s-kem-vy-musulmanskie-aktivisty-i-sleduet-li-nam-vas-boyatsya).
Gorevoy himself suggests that Muslims
from the North Caucasus were ready to take up the cudgels against the Buddhist
regime in Myanmar is because Russia’s Muslims have longstanding grievances
against the Buddhists in Russia and especially those in Kalmykia, a Buddhist
republic which adjoins the North Caucasus.
Relations between the Kalmyks and
the Chechens have long been tense, Gorevoy says, pointing to such recent
examples as “the Elista pogroms last spring when a Daghestani athlete
desecrated a statue of Buddha” and earlier clashes between the two religious
groups when Chechens desecrated a Kalmyk cemetery in Astrakhan.
To be sure, “the number of victims
of clashes in Kalmykia and in Myanmar are incomparable -- if it is in fact
appropriate to compare them. People have died, and it isn’t critical whether
there were 25 as in Kalmykia or 400 as in Myanmar,” the Novaya Versiya journalist argues.
What matters, he says, is that in
contrast to the past, when no North Caucasian leader would talk about the
Buddhist Kalmyks as an enemy, Kadyrov is now quite ready to do so in the case
of the Myanmar Buddhists. But both he and his listeners are aware of the link.
(See windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2017/09/moscow-bears-major-responsibility-for.html).
But Kadyrov had other axes to grind,
Gorevoy continues. He wanted to underscore his ties with Saudi Arabia, he
wanted to demonstrate that he is a power to be reckoned with so that Moscow
would not, as it again threatened to do at the end of August, cut his subsidies,
and he wanted to show himself a power among Russia’s Muslims and the Islamic
community abroad.
The demonstration at the Myanmar
embassy and even more the meeting in Grozny showed, orientalist Anatoly
Nesmiyan says, that “there exists in the country an organized force which has
resources that are not under the control of the [central] authorities” and that
these resources can be deployed otherwise “if required.”
Kadyrov will be loyal to Moscow and
Putin as long as the center provides him with funding and support, the analyst
continues, but if either appears to be weakening, then the Chechen leader is
quite willing to demonstrate his independent power base among the Muslims of
Chechnya and the North Caucasus in particular and across Russia more generally.
Lev Vershinin, another Moscow
political analyst, agrees and says that Kadyrov is completely uninterested the
issue of Muslims in Myanmar. He has simply used them as an occasion to build up
support in the North Caucasus by taking a stand against Buddhism in general and
thus the Kalmyks.
And the Chechen leader has also
shown that he understands that he can gain influence by solidifying his
friendship with the Saudi Arabians and also by demonstrating his ability to
organize protests to challenge Kazan not only for the religious leadership of
Russia’s Muslims but also for their secular leadership.
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