Paul
Goble
Staunton, September 5 – For any
country, the destruction of monuments to be significant, the ideas that gave
rise to those memorialized need to be addressed; and in the case of Russia, in
contrast to the countries of Eastern Europe, that idea is one that no one is
yet prepared to address in a serious way, according to Irina Birna.
According to the Moscow commentator,
“the idea which gave birth to Russian monuments was not brought in from outside,
instead the essence of the idea is deeply national and as such existential.
Consequently, to destroy any monuments to the idols of the idea means to
destroy Russia” (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=59ADA2688C302).
And that idea,
Birna argues, arose in tsarist times, extended through Soviet ones, and
continues to inform the thinking of Russians today. Put in simplest terms, it
is this: Russia can only exist and hold together if there does not exist “an
all-Russian terrorist organization” like the tsarist Okhrana, the Bolshevik Cheka
and KGB, or the FSB now.
She says “it is time for the Russian
‘opposition’ to advance to the next level of historical analysis and understand
that Lenin’s ‘communism’ is indivisible from the country’s historical development
and was a continuation and development … of the power-forming ideas at the base
of ‘the Russian system’ – the ideas of constant expansion at the expense of its
neighbors.”
From the point of
view of Russian history, there is nothing really new in Bolshevik talk about “’a
world revolution.” It is simply a new way of talking about the desire to take
the straits and then everything else. And
Russian discourse since 1991 has not fundamentally changed either, Birna
suggests.
Everyone should imagine what would
have happened if the revolutionary “hot heads” had ignored Boris Yeltsin’s
argument that “the country needs the KGB, that without a secret police, not a
single country in the world could exist, however democratic it was” and his
promises that “the KGB will be transformed.”
Had Russians not listened to the
first Russian president, had they stormed and destroyed the Lubyanka, many
things would be very different now. A free Chechnya would be “guaranteed.” An
independent Ingushetia, Daghestan, and several other North Caucasian republics
would be likely, and a free and independent Turkestan would be very probable.”
Moreover, Birna continues, “with
varying degrees of probability, other places would have separated as well: the
Kuban, Sakha, the Far east, Karelia … and the Urals.” And still others, like Circassia would raise
the issue of their borders and the return of Sochi to within a state of their
own.
But what Russians would have wanted
that? she asks rhetorically. And she
answers that almost no one; and “that is why those Russian ‘democrats’ and ‘liberals’
… willingly ‘believed’ Yeltsin and his tales about ‘the reorganization’ of the KGB,’
its ‘subordination,’ its ‘democratization,’ and ‘the imposition of limits’ of the
cast of executioners.”
Because that continues to be the
case, because even the most critical liberals don’t want to do away with the idea
that underlay not only the tsarist and Soviet systems but also the post-Soviet
one, it is a matter of indifference what statues are taken down unless and
until Russians will face and reject the idea that they all represent, Birna
says.
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