Paul Goble
Staunton, September 6 – Last Sunday
is likely to pass into history as “the birthday of political Islam in Russia,” London-based
Russian commentator Andrey Ostalsky says, a development that represents a turn
of events that will leave the country “much changed” however the Kremlin
responds.
What signaled this development,
Ostalsky says was a demonstration by Muslims in front of the Myanmar embassy in
Moscow against that country’s repression of the Rohinja minority, an event that
attracted much attention that that creates “an important precedent” for the
followers of Islam in the Russian Federation (svoboda.org/a/28718718.html).
The
Russian authorities clearly did not know how to respond at least initially, he continues,
and as a result Russia’s Muslims began to feel themselves a unified force and
may now act on that basis not only concerning foreign policy issues but on
domestic ones as well – and in particular on “the interrelationship of Muslim
communities with the secular powers.
That suggests, the commentator
argues, that political Islam has now emerged in Russia. But that term is
problematic not only because Muslim theologians reject it – Islam by definition
and from the beginning has been a political program – but also because the term
is applied to groups from the most radical to the most moderate within the
Islamic world.
After the end of the caliphate, the
last state where the ruler combined political and religious authority, modern
political Islam emerged in Egypt with the Muslim brotherhood that wanted to
restore the earlier form of rule. Its
supporters, Ostalsky recalls, began to be called “’Islamists.’”
That term too is one the ulema does
not recognize, he continues; and like “political Islam,” it includes a variety
of forces from those who want to restore the caliphate to those who want
shariat to be the basis of law to those who simply seek protection for their
values from the secular authorities.
Ostalsky notes that “some
authoritative Sunni theologians consider that almost all of Russia’s territory
should be considered part of the ‘dar-ul-Islam,’” the “abode of peace” in which
Islam is to rule. They point to the fact that in 1313 CE, “Khan Uzbek
proclaimed shariat on the territory of the Golden Horde and this was a large
part of the territory of present-day Russia.”
Contemporary Islamists in Russia can
look back to a tradition of “political Islam” at the end of the 19th
and beginning of the 20th centuries.
Then the jadids, a group which
promoted the modernization of the faith, called for the revival of Islam and
for its followers to live in peace and equality with Christians, Jews, and believers
in other faiths.
The jadids formed what Ostalsky properly calls “a completely liberal”
all-Russian organization, Ittifaq
al-Muslimin (“the Union of Muslims”) which entered into an alliance with the
Constitutional Democrats. The Soviets destroyed this group, and today, Ostalsky
says, “it is impossible to imagine” that followers of political Islam will
revive that tradition.
Most of them view the jadids as
traitors to the faith for “’playing with European values.” And consequently, especially if they face
resistance from the authorities, today’s Islamists in Russia are likely to
become radical rather than return to moderation. Exactly how things will work out, however,
remains very unclear.
Ostalsky says that “at present we
know too little” about the Islamists of Russia.
They are back, however, and they are going to carve out a role. That role of course will reflect Russian realities
too, he says, because “without doubt every country and every society has the kind
of political Islam it deserves,” radical or moderate as the case may be.
No comments:
Post a Comment